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THE STATUS OF THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT-
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TRIAD IN THE
DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS AND IN RECENT
U.S. TRADE POLICY
Kevin C. Kennedy*
INTRODUCTION
Making environmental protection and sustainable development an
integral part of international trade is not simply a bilateral issue. Rather,
achieving the goals of environmental protection and sustainable development
requires multilateral and regional approaches and solutions. Consequently, the
work of intergovernmental organizations, most importantly the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Environment Program, is crucial
to the smooth functioning and proper integration of the interrelationship among
trade, environment, and sustainable development. Progress at the WTO on
integrating trade, environment, and sustainable development has been glacial.
By default, it has fallen to bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs)
to take up the slack.
In the follow-up to the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development held at Rio de Janeiro (the Rio Earth Summit), the United
Nations sponsored an international conference on sustainable development at
Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002.1 At the conclusion of the 2002 World
Summit on Sustainable Development (the WSSD), the participants proposed an
ambitious plan of action. Among the many goals of the WSSD identified in its
Plan of Implementation, at least three focus on the interrelationship among
investment, trade, environment, and sustainable development: (1) "[p]romote
mutual supportiveness between the multilateral trading system and the
multilateral environmental agreements, consistent with sustainable development
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goals, in support of the work programme agreed through WTO, while
recognizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of both sets of
instruments" 2; (2) "encourage efforts to promote cooperation on trade,
environment and sustainable development... between the secretariats of WTO,
UNCTAD [the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which
assists developing and least-developed countries with integrating into the WTO
multilateral trading system], UNDP [the United Nations Development Program,
which assists developing countries with issues of governance and poverty
reduction], UNEP [the United Nations Environment Program, which assesses
global environmental conditions, develops multilateral environmental
agreements, and integrates economic development and environmental
protection] and other relevant international environmental and development and
regional organizations" 3; and (3) "strengthen cooperation among UNEP and
other United Nations bodies and specialized agencies, the Bretton Woods
institutions and WTO, within their mandates.
'A
Measured against these ambitious goals, what has been achieved at the
World Trade Organization since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable
Development? Barring some unforeseen breakthrough at the WTO, the lack of
any serious discussion about the interface of trade, environment, and
sustainable development over the past seven years may mean that no WTO
ministerial-level decision will ever be issued on this vitally important subject.
The implications for the United States are that bilateral and regional free trade
and investment agreements will have to carry more of the load on this score.
At the national level, what efforts has the United States undertaken to
make protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable
development a reality in its bilateral free trade agreements? The second half of
this paper examines parallel developments in the United States since 2002, in
particular the revised environmental and sustainable development provisions
that have been recently added to the FTAs negotiated with Colombia, Panama,
Peru, and South Korea in 2007, and in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT)
entered into with Uruguay in 2006. Briefly, for the first time in the history of
the U.S. BIT program, the U.S.-Uruguay BIT includes two provisions that
address the interface of investment and environmental protection. The
environment and investment chapters of the four most recent FTAs (three of
which are still pending congressional approval as of the date of this article)
signal a modest departure from the investment and environment chapters of
post-NAFTA sister FTAs. Thus, for example, consistent with the North
2. U.N. Johannesburg World Summit 2002, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Plan of
Implementation of the World Summit of Sustainable Development, 92, (Sept. 23, 2002),
www.un.org/jsummitlhtml/documents/undocs.html (follow "Plan of Implementation of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development" hyperlink) [hereinafter WSSD Plan of
Implementation].
3. Id. 91(c).
4. Id. 136.
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),5 this set of four FTAs once again
gives primacy to an expanded list of seven multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) (NAFTA listed only three MEAs), so that in the event of
an inconsistency between the FTA and the MEAs, the latter will prevail. This
return to NAFTA's hierarchy of MEAs over FTA provisions could prove to be
a useful means of reinforcing commitments made under the covered MEAs.
However, a long-range, integrated package of technical assistance, trade
capacity building, and environmental cooperation needs to be initiated by the
United States, and the United States needs to be prepared to financially support
this package over the ten- to-fifteen-year implementation period of an FTA.
I. PROGRESS AT THE WTO SINCE THE WSSD IN PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
In anticipation of the WSSD, the trade ministers of the WTO Members
made the following declaration regarding sustainable development at their
biennial ministerial conference held in 2001 at Doha, Qatar:
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of
sustainable development, as stated in the Preamble to the
Marrakesh Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of
upholding and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory
multilateral trading system, and acting for the protection of the
environment and the promotion of sustainable development
can and must be mutually supportive. We take note of the
efforts by Members to conduct national environmental
assessments of trade policies on a voluntary basis. We
recognize that under WTO rules no country should be
prevented from taking measures for the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at the
levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that
they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in
accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements. We
welcome the WTO's continued cooperation with UNEP and
other inter-governmental environmental organizations. We
encourage efforts to promote cooperation between the WTO
and relevant international environmental and developmental
organizations, especially in the lead-up to the World Summit
on Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg,
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex, art. 1114.2, Dec. 17, 1992,32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2009]
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South Africa, in September 2002.6
The one sector-specific item on the Doha Round agenda with a clear
sustainable development dimension is found in paragraph 28 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration; namely, the reduction of fisheries subsidies that have
encouraged over-fishing and fostered depletion of the world's fish stocks. More
broadly, under paragraph 31 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the WTO
Members agreed to negotiations on a set of three interrelated items:
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific
trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in
scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as
among parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall
not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a
party to the MEA in question;
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between
MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the
criteria for the granting of observer status;
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.7
In addition to the items identified in paragraph 31 that are the subject of
negotiation, paragraph 51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration directs the WTO
Committees on Trade and Development and Trade and Environment "to
identify and debate developmental and environmental aspects of the
negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having sustainable
development appropriately reflected.",8 Together, paragraphs 31 and 51 of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration represent the "environmental package" of the
Doha Round negotiations.
In the way of concrete results, very little, if anything, has actually been
achieved to date at the WTO on these mandates. The explanation for the lack
6. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I, 41 I.L.M. 746, 746-747 (2002), available at http://www.un-
documents.net/doha-md.htm.
7. Id. at 751.
8. Id. at 754. At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference held in 2005, trade ministers
called upon the membership to intensify the negotiations on all parts of paragraph 31 of the
Doha Declaration in order to fulfill the mandate. World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO-e/minist-e/min05_e/final-text-e.pdf.
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of significant progress is that the topic of trade, environment, and sustainable
development has taken a backseat at the WTO to the all-consuming
negotiations on agricultural trade. Agricultural trade has become the obsessive
focus of the Doha Round multilateral trade negotiations that were launched in
November 2001, just as they were the central focus of the Uruguay Round that
was launched in 1986 and finally concluded in 1994. Almost from its
inception, the Doha Round has moved at a snail's pace. After nearly three
years of stalemate, the WTO General Council issued a decision in August 2004
that attempted to break the logjam, outlining a work program for the remainder
of the negotiations. 9 Included in the General Council's decision was a
statement reaffirming "[m]embers' commitment to progress in all of these areas
of the negotiations in line with the Doha mandates.'" This reaffirmation
covers the work of the Committee on Trade and Environment. Not
surprisingly, the term "sustainable development" is not found in the General
Council's 2004 decision, considering that the topic of agricultural subsidies and
market access for agricultural products had largely eclipsed all other negotiation
issues.
Despite this valiant effort to reinvigorate the stalled Doha Round
negotiations, the Doha Round has limped along for another four years. In the
meantime, the President's trade promotion authority (formerly known as "fast-
track" authority) expired in July 2007. Without such authority, shepherding
any Doha Round agreement through Congress without amendment is a virtual
impossibility, thus sounding the death knell of the Doha Round. Hope lingers
that if the Doha Round is successfully concluded, Congress might agree to a
specific fast-track approval process for any Doha Round multilateral agreement
that eventually emerges. Of course, this is piling one huge assumption -
successful completion of the Doha Round - on top of an even bigger
assumption - fast-track approval by a Democrat-controlled Congress. Given the
current state of the Doha Round negotiations in Geneva and the political
climate in Washington toward international trade, a successful conclusion of the
Doha Round and subsequent approval by Congress are both distant goals.
Turning to the Doha Round negotiations at the WTO, what progress has
been made within the Committee on Trade and Environment on its paragraph
31 and paragraph 51 Doha Declaration mandates? In a July 2007 status report,
the chairman of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) had no
progress to report in connection with paragraph 51 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration." With regard to paragraph 31(i) of the Doha Ministerial
9. See WTO GENERAL COUNCIL, DOHA WORK PROGRAMME WT/L/579 (2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/ddae/ddadraft_3 jul04_e.pdf.
10. Id. at 3.
11. See Comm. On Trade and Env't, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Mario Matus, to
the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/17 (July 25, 2007). The Chairman's report was
limited to reporting on the progress of the items contained in paragraph 31 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration. See Comm. On Trade and Dev., Developmental Aspects of the Doha
Round of Negotiations, Note by the Secretariat, WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.2, 2 (June 27,2006)
2009]
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Declaration on the relationship between the WTO agreements and the specific
trade obligations set out in MEAs, the CTE has attempted to develop a common
understanding of the negotiating mandate. Various terms contained in the
mandate, such as "specific trade obligation" and "multilateral environmental
agreement," have been examined by the WTO Members.
On the meaning of the term "multilateral environmental agreement"
China offered the following definition: "MEAs are international treaties
designed to protect and improve environment, and properly exploit natural
resources."' 12 In China's view, MEAs should have five elements: (1)
authoritativeness (MEAs should have been negotiated under the auspices of the
United Nations system); (2) universality (an MEA should have a substantial
number of contracting parties that account for a majority of WTO Members);
(3) openness (the agreement should be open for accession by relevant parties);
(4) impact on trade (MEAs should contain explicit trade measures, the
implementation of which should have a substantial impact on trade); and (5)
effectiveness (an MEA should be in force and open for accession).' 3 To these
five elements India has added a sixth: "there must have been effective
participation in the negotiations by countries belonging to different
geographical regions and by countries at different stages of economic and social
development.'
14
The Committee participants generally agreed that a specific trade
obligation (STO) is one that requires an MEA party to take, or refrain from
taking, a particular action. Certain obligations in six MEAs have been
identified as STOs by several WTO Members: the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, and the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 5
(reporting that no progress had been made in the Committee on Trade and Development on the
paragraph 51 mandate).
12. Comm. On Trade and Env't, Identification of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs) and Specific Trade Obligations, Submission by China, TN/TE/W/35/Rev. 1, 3 (July 3,
2003).
13. See id. Malaysia echoed China's views on the elements of an MEA, expressly noting
that regional MEAs are not within the scope of the term. See Comm. On Trade and Env't.,
Paragraph 31 (1) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, Submission by Malaysia, TN/TE/W/29,
8-9 (Apr. 30, 2003).
14. Comm. On Trade and Dev., Relationship Between Specific Trade Obligations Set Out
in MEAs and WTO Rules, Submission by India, TN/TE/W/23, 4 (Feb. 20, 2003).
15. See Comm. On Trade and Env't., Sub-Paragraph 31(1) of the Doha Declaration,
Submission by the United States, TN/TE/W/20, 11 (Feb. 10, 2003); Comm. On Trade and
Env't, Proposalfor an Outcome on Trade and Environment Concerning Paragraph 31 (1) of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, Submission from Australia andArgentina, TN/TE/W/72/Rev. 1,
5 (May 7, 2007).
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HeinOnline -- 19 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 534 2009
2009] TRADE-ENVIRONMENT-SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TRIAD 535
Consistent with the WSSD Plan of Implementation, several WTO
Members have made proposals relating to governance principles that are aimed
at ensuring mutual supportiveness of WTO-MEA regimes. The following
summarizes the proposals and principles that have emerged in discussions at
the CTE during the course of the Doha Round (no consensus has built around
any of these submissions):
- No Hierarchy. MEAs and the WTO legal regime are "bodies of
international law of equal standing.' 6 Thus, there is no hierarchy between the
WTO and MEA legal regimes.
17
- Deference. MEAs and the WTO have distinct competencies within a
"multilateral governance framework. Accordingly, their respective expertise in
environmental and trade issues should be exploited."' 8 A corollary is that
multilateral environmental policy should be made within multilateral
environmental fora, not within the WTO, in accordance with each body's
respective expertise and mandate. When a WTO dispute settlement panel
"examines issues with an environmental content, relating to a particular MEA,
the panel should call for and defer . . . to the expertise of the MEA in
question."' 19
- Dispute Settlement and Choice of Forum. Closely linked to the
principle of deference is dispute settlement and choice of forum. As noted by
Switzerland, "We should not fall into the pitfall of wanting to deal with issues
in the wrong forum, just because it may be more convenient for one or the other
,,20
reason (like the availability of an effective dispute settlement system). While
16. Comm. On Trade and Env't., Proposalfor a Decision of the Ministerial Conference on
Trade and Environment, Submission by the European Communities, TN/TE/W/68, 2 (June 30,
2006)[hereinafter Environment]; Comm. on Trade and Env't, The Relationship Between WTO
Rules and MEAs, Submission by Switzerland, TN/TE/W/6 1, 3 (Oct. 10, 2005)[hereinafter
Rules Switzerland]. Compare the WTO Members' submissions with NAFTA Article 104, which
gives primacy to three MEAs (CITES, the Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention) in the
event of a conflict between them and any article in NAFTA.
17. In the hierarchy of international law, jus cogens - peremptory norms of international
law - always are superior to any other inconsistent international law rule, whether it is
conventional law or customary international law. According to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,jus cogens are norms accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole, from which no derogation is permitted. The prohibitions on genocide,
torture, slavery, and piracy, for example, are recognized asjus cogens. Neither WTO law nor
MEAs have the status ofjus cogens. Second, according to the principle ofjusposterior, newer
law takes precedence over older law. This rule only applies if the countries involved in a
conflict are parties to the old and new law. Third, according to the rule of lex specialis, more
specific law take precedence over more general law. This rule only applies between countries
that are both parties to the conflicting rules. See Rules Switzerland, supra note 16, 2.
18. See Environment, supra note 16, 2.
19. Id. 3.
20. Comm. on Trade and Env't, The Relationship Between Existing WTO Rules and
Specific Trade Obligations (STOs) Set Out in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs):
A Swiss Perspective on National Experiences and Criteria used in the Negotiation and
Implementation of MEAs, Submission of Switzerland, TN/TE/W/58, 17(c) (July 6, 2005)
[hereinafter Rules and STOs].HeinOnline -- 19 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 535 2009
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WTO Members have the right to bring disputes to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, if a dispute arises between WTO Members that are also parties to
an MEA over trade measures that they are applying pursuant to the MEA, then
arguably they should resolve it through the dispute settlement mechanism
available under the MEA.21 This suggestion must be balanced, however,
against the direction in Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding that all WTO rules disputes are to be resolved within the
WTO. 22
- Mutual Supportiveness. The principle of mutual supportiveness,
identified in paragraph 98 of the WSSD Plan of Implementation, is based on
the assumption that the overall objective of both environmental and trade
regimes is the same; namely, improvement of the human condition.23
Consequently, under WTO rules, no country should be prevented from taking
measures for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, or of the
environment, thus ensuring the level of protection it considers appropriate.
Efforts to safeguard the non-discriminatory multilateral trading system must go
hand in hand with the commitment to sustainable development. All WTO
bodies should "ensure that the interpretation and application of WTO rules
takes due account of, and is mutually supportive with, provisions of MEAs. '24
In that connection, treaties should be construed so as not to create a conflict
with other rules of international treaty law. Accordingly, WTO rules should be
interpreted in a manner that does not conflict with MEA rules, and vice versa.
25
Unilateral action should be avoided as far as possible. "Unilateral
actions, taken without being supported by multilateral mandates, not only
counteract multilateral efforts in dealing with multilateral environmental
problems, but also damage the multilateral systems established for the purpose
of coping with environmental problems in a collaborative way.,
26
- Transparency. Working hand-in-glove with the principle of mutual
supportiveness is transparency. A mechanism for regular information exchange
21. See Environment, supra note 16.
22. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art.
23.1, Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1243 (1994) ("When
Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of
the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of
this Understanding."). In the view of at least one WTO Member, Article 23 is tantamount to an
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction provision. See Comm. on Trade and Env't, Comments by
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on the Submission of
the European Communities: "The Relationship Between WTO Rules and MEAs in the Context
of the Global Governance System," TN/TE/W/41, 6 (June 18,2004) [hereinafter Comments by
SC71.
23. See Rules and STOs, supra note 20, 17(b).
24. See Environment, supra note 16, 2.
25. See Rules Switzerland, supra note 16, 4.
26. See Comments by SCT, supra note 22, 4.
[Vol. 19:3
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between the WTO and MEAs has been proposed.27 One of the main objectives
of information exchange is the promotion of mutual supportiveness of the
environmental and trading systems and the promotion of coherence between the
two systems. There are numerous benefits in enhancing cooperation between
the secretariats of the MEAs and the WTO, including the prevention of
conflicts between MEAs and WTO rules. Information exchange at the
international level is essential to achieving complementarities between trade
and environmental institutions.
II. NEXT STEPS AT THE WTO
A successful completion of the Doha Round could have beneficial effects
for the environment and sustainable development. Specifically, in the area of
agricultural subsidies, domestic and export subsidies by developed countries -
in particular, by the United States and the EU - have encouraged
overproduction of field crops (corn, cotton, wheat, and soybeans, for example).
Such overproduction has in turn put pressure on natural resources, including
water and arable land.28 In addition, this overproduction has caused injury to
farmers in developing countries who cannot compete in domestic and
international markets with subsidized agricultural products sold by farmers in
developed countries in those same markets. 29 Thus, if the Doha Round is able
to secure real reductions in farm subsidies, important gains for sustainable
development in the agriculture sector could be achieved.
To enhance policy coordination and coherence in the WTO/MEA field,
continued and increased cooperation and information flow between the WTO
and MEA secretariats is important.3 °  Close cooperation between these
secretariats could also contribute to promoting synergies between trade and
environment and ensuring consistency with regard to the competencies of the
respective institutions. Lines of communication and increased information flow
between the MEA secretariats and the WTO should be strengthened, for
example, by institutionalizing exchange sessions, as well as by granting
observer status to MEA secretariats as appropriate. 3' Taking steps toward
giving observer status to MEA secretariats will improve the institutional
standing of the WTO in the global community by sending a positive signal to
27. See Environment, supra note 16, 2.
28. See, e.g., Comm. on Trade and Env't. and Trade and Dev., Sustainability Impact
Assessments, Communications from the European Communities, Annex III, Sustainability
Impact Assessment of the WTO Negotiations in the Major Food Crops Sector,
WT/COMTD/W/99, WT/CTE/W/208, TN/TE/W/3 (June 3, 2002).
29. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
30. See, e.g., Comm. on Trade and Env't, Contribution of the United States on Paragraph
31(i) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, TN/TE/W/5 (June 6, 2002).
31. See, e.g., Comm. on Trade and Env't., The Relationship between WTO Rules andMEAs
in the Context of the Global Governance System, Submission of the European Communities,
TN/TE/W/39 (Mar. 24, 2004).
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civil society in both developed and developing countries that the trade and
environment linkage is receiving close attention at the WTO. Moreover,
observer status for relevant MEAs in WTO bodies, as appropriate, can play a
positive role in creating clearer appreciation of the mutually supportive role of
trade and environmental policies. Not only should requests from MEAs for
observer status be considered in this light, but the CTE should also consider
extending invitations to appropriate MEA institutions to attend relevant
discussions at the CTE. The WSSD reiterated this goal in its Plan of
Implementation, stating that "measures should be taken to strengthen
sustainable development institutional arrangements at all levels" in order to
achieve objectives such as "integration of the economic, social and
environmental dimensions of sustainable development in a balanced manner"
and "enhancing participation and effective involvement of civil society and
other relevant stakeholders .... .
In the face of, or perhaps in spite of, the lack of solid progress by the two
WTO Committees charged with the responsibility of advancing sustainable
development on the Doha Round agenda, in early 2007, WTO Director-General
Pascal Lamy called for greater attention to sustainable development at the WTO
in a speech delivered to the UNEP.33 Of course, a necessary but not sufficient
condition to whether principles of sustainable development are to find their way
into the WTO legal regime is the success of the Doha Round. The ambition
with which those negotiations were launched in late 2001 has waned
considerably over the past seven years. Today, their focus has narrowed to
three topics: trade in agriculture (the reduction of subsidies and tariffs),
improved market access for industrial goods, and improved market access for
trade in services. Even if the Doha Round negotiations do yield some modest
results - which seems doubtful considering that the negotiations are on the
brink of total collapse - the absence of any serious discussion about the
interface of trade, environment, and sustainable development may mean that no
ministerial-level decision at the WTO will be issued on this vitally important
subject. The implications for the United States are that bilateral and regional
FTAs will have to carry more of the load.
In summary, to ensure mutual supportiveness between the WTO and
MEAs, proper policy coordination, cooperation, and information exchange at
national and international levels are essential. There are broad benefits to be
gained from policy cooperation, not only in ensuring legal consistency, and
thereby avoiding potential conflicts, but also in identifying synergies between
international trade and environmental policies so that the international
community might move closer to achieving its proclaimed overarching
32. WSSD Plan of Implementation, supra note 2, 121.
33. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Address to the UNEP Global Ministerial Environment
Forum: Globalization and the Environment in a Reformed UN: Charting a Sustainable
Development Path, (Feb. 5, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
spple/sppl54_e.htm).
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objective of sustainable development. In short, WTO rules should not be
interpreted in "clinical isolation, 34 from other bodies of international law and
without considering other complementary bodies of international law, including
MEAs.
IV. PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES IN PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FTAs SINCE THE WSSD
In the Trade Act of 2002, , the U.S. Congress identified sustainable
development as one of the many goals to be achieved in any bilateral, regional,
or multilateral trade and investment agreement negotiated by the United States.
How well has the United States done in that regard? After a lull of nearly nine
years since the United States last concluded an FTA (that being the NAFTA in
1993), the Bush Administration concluded and implemented a series of nine
bilateral and regional FTAs beginning in 2001 - all but one since 2004 - with
fourteen countries. Bilateral FTAs (the year of the FTA's entry into force is
indicated in parentheses) were concluded and implemented with Jordan (2001),
Chile (2004), Singapore (2004), Australia (2005), Morocco (2006), Bahrain
(2006), Oman (2006), and Peru (2009). The one regional FTA, the Dominican
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), was
concluded and implemented with one Caribbean and five Central American
nations: Costa Rica (2008), the Dominican Republic (2007), El Salvador
(2006), Guatemala (2006), Honduras (2006), and Nicaragua (2006). FTAs
were concluded with Panama, Colombia, and Korea in 2007 and await
congressional approval. FTAs are being negotiated with Malaysia, Thailand,
and the United Arab Emirates.
When Congress renewed the President's fast-track negotiating authority
in the Trade Act of 2002,36 it identified the following environmental and
sustainable development negotiating objectives to be pursued by the United
States:
(1) ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually
supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the environment
and enhance the international means of doing so, while
optimizing the use of the world's resources;
34. Appellate Body Report, United States - StandardsforReformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29,1996) ("That direction reflects a measure of
recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public
international law" (referring to the clarification of WTO provisions in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, which the Appellate Body has been
directed to apply)).
35. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(1 1)(D-E) (2002).
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(2) seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to
those agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or
reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and
labor laws as an encouragement for trade;
(3) ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United
States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental
laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the parties, while
recognizing a party's right to exercise discretion with respect
to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance
matters and to prioritize allocation of resources for
environmental law enforcement;
(4) strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to protect
the environment through the promotion of sustainable
development;
(5) reduce or eliminate government practices or policies that
unduly threaten sustainable development; and
(6) seek market access, through the elimination of tariffs and
non-tariff barriers, for U.S. environmental technologies, goods
and services.37
NAFTA's environmental provisions and its environmental side
agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC),38 have served as a general baseline for all environmental provisions
contained in post-NAFTA FTAs negotiated by the United States. By way of
overview, first, all FTAs negotiated by the Bush Administration contain
provisions on the interrelationship among trade, investment, and environment
that are loosely modeled after the NAAEC. In addition, in a first-of-its-kind
provision in any U.S. BIT, the 2006 BIT between the United States and
Uruguay included an article on the environment that is modeled after a parallel
provision in the environment chapter of DR-CAFTA, as well as a provision on
indirect expropriation that is also modeled after a parallel provision in DR-
CAFTA. Second, all Bush Administration FTAs have been subject to
37. See id. § 3802.
38. See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
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environmental review by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Third,
four FTAs that were negotiated with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea
in 2007 contain enhanced environmental and sustainable development
provisions mandated by the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy that was
reached between Congress and the White House in May 2007.
Against this backdrop, the balance of this paper will discuss the
developments within the United States since NAFTA regarding making
environmental protection and sustainable development an integral part of U.S.
FTAs and BITs.
IH. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS OF FTAs
In 1993, environmental groups filed an action in federal court to compel
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to produce an environmental impact
statement for NAFTA. 39 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled
that because the President's submission of NAFTA to Congress for approval
was not "final agency action," the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply
and, consequently, an environmental impact statement was not required under
the National Environmental Policy Act.4 °
Undaunted by their failure in court, environmental groups pressured the
Clinton Administration to subject all proposed FTAs to some type of
environmental impact assessment. In 1999, the Clinton Administration obliged
by instituting environmental reviews of all FTAs.4 1 The Executive Order states
that "[t]rade agreements should contribute to the broader goal of sustainable
development," and that "[e]nvironmental reviews are an important tool to help
identify potential environmental effects of trade agreements, both positive and
negative, and to help facilitate consideration of appropriate responses to those
effects whether in the course of negotiations, through other means, or both. ' 42
The Executive Order and implementing guidelines required an assessment and
consideration of the environmental impacts of trade agreements, including
39. See Pub. Citizen v. U. S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994).
40. Id. at 553.
41. See Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg.
63,169 (Nov. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Environmental Review of Trade Agreements]. See also
The Guidelines for Implementation of Exec. Order 13,141, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,442 (Dec. 19,
1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/environmentlenvironmental.shtml. The USTR and the
Council on Environmental Qualityjointly oversee implementation of the Order and Guidelines.
The USTR, through the Trade Policy Staff Committee, is responsible for conducting the
individual reviews. As described in the Guidelines, the focus of this review is on the possible
effects in the United States, although transboundary and global effects may be considered as
appropriate and prudent. Only one FTA was subject to an environmental review during the
Clinton Administration, that being the FTA with Jordan that was negotiated by the Clinton
Administration but implemented by the Bush Administration. This is not unlike the history of
NAFTA that was negotiated by the elder Bush but shepherded through Congress by Clinton.
42. See Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, supra note 41.HeinOnline -- 19 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 541 2009
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written reviews of environmentally significant trade agreements. In 2001, the
Bush Administration announced that it would continue the Clinton
Administration's policy of conducting environmental reviews of trade
agreements pursuant to the latter's executive order and implementing
guidelines.43
The main focus of FTA environmental reviews is the potential
environmental impacts of FTAs on the United States. However, reviews
include consideration of global and transboundary effects as well. An analysis
of the eight U.S. FTA final environmental reviews that have been conducted
since 1999 is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the final environmental
review of DR-CAFTA, the most hotly contested FTA since NAFTA, reached
the following conclusions:44
• "[C]hanges in the pattern and magnitude of trade flows attributable to
the FTA will not have any significant environmental impacts in the United
States."4'
* DR-CAFTA "will not adversely affect the ability of U.S. federal, state,
local, or tribal governments to regulate to protect the U.S. environment."
46
- Within the Dominican Republic and Central American countries that are
parties to DR-CAFTA, "net changes in production and trade are expected to be
relatively small because exports to the United States from these countries
already face low or zero tariffs. Longer term effects, through investment and
economic development, are expected to be greater but cannot currently be
predicted in terms of timing, type, and environmental implications."4
7
* DR-CAFTA "may have indirect effects on the U.S. environment
through transboundary transmission of pollutants (air and water), and through
effects on habitat for wildlife, including migratory species. The review
examined a range of possible impacts, but did not identify any specific,
significant consequences for the U.S. environment.
'
""
- DR-CAFTA "can have positive environmental consequences in Central
America and the Dominican Republic by reinforcing efforts to effectively
enforce environmental laws, accelerating economic growth and development
through trade and investment, and disseminating environmentally beneficial
technologies."49  A potential negative consequence is deforestation and
subsequent loss of habitat for migratory birds.
43. See Delegation of Certain Authorities and Assignment of Certain Functions Under the
Trade Act of 2002, Exec. Order 13,277, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,305 (Nov. 19, 2002).
44. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Final Environmental Review of the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement - Executive
Summary (Feb. 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/CAFTA/
assetupload file953_7901 .pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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* "As a complement to DR-CAFTA, the United States and the FTA
partner countries signed a [NAFTA-plus] Environmental Cooperation
Agreement that will enhance the positive environmental consequences of the
Agreement.,
50
Several environmental groups opposed DR-CAFTA and took issue with
the USTR's environmental review.51 Although their specific concerns with
DR-CAFTA were not addressed, some of their concerns were acknowledged
and given expression in the Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy that was
reached between the Bush Administration and Congress in 2007.
IV. THE BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON TRADE POLICY
In May 2007, the Democrat-controlled Congress and the Bush
Administration brokered a compromise understanding called the Bipartisan
Agreement on Trade Policy,52 also known as the "New Trade Policy
Template. 53 The Bipartisan Agreement calls for enhanced provisions in all
future U.S. bilateral and regional FTAs on: (1) intellectual property protection
(striking a balance between the rights of drug companies to protect their patents
and the needs of developing countries for life-saving drugs); (2) labor rights
(requiring that FTA countries adopt the five basic internationally-recognized
labor principles of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, i.e., freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor, the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms
of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation); (3) investment (ensuring that foreign investors in the United
States have no greater rights than U.S. investors); (4) government procurement
(requiring that labor rights protections be included in government procurement
contracts); (5) port security (guaranteeing that if a country invokes the national
security exception with regard to port security, such an invocation cannot be
challenged in an FTA dispute settlement proceeding); and (6) environmental
protection and sustainable development (discussed next).
Turning to the environmental provisions of the Bipartisan Agreement, the
parties to all future FTAs (including those that had already been negotiated with
Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea) must adopt, maintain, and
50. Id. at 3.
51. See Environmentalists' Letter to Congress on CAFTA, Inside U.S. Trade (Feb. 20,
2004).
52. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON
TRADE POLICY (May 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/
FactSheets/2007/asset uploadfile127_11319.pdf [hereinafter, BIPARTIsAN AGREEMENT].
53. See Susan C. Schwab, Ambassador, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Statement on U.S.
Trade Agenda (May 10, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
PressReleases/2007/May/StatementfromAmbassadorSusanCSchwab onUS trade_
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implement laws, regulations, and all other measures to comply with the
following seven MEAs: (1) the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species; (2) the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting
Substances; (3) the Convention on Marine Pollution; (4) the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Convention; (5) the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands; (6) the
International Whaling Convention; and (7) the Convention on Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 4 However, as bold as this requirement
may seem at first blush, it contains three significant qualifications that
substantially narrow its application." First, in order to establish a violation of
this commitment, the complaining Party must show that the responding Party's
failure to fulfill an obligation under one of the covered MEAs has been
"through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction" - language that
tracks verbatim the NAAEC's definition of what constitutes a "persistent
pattern of failure." Second, the sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction must be "in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties. 56  In other words, if the violation occurs outside the trade or
investment context, then it cannot be the subject of a complaint. Third, an
escape clause has been added that excuses non-enforcement in the bona fide
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.57
Next, in the environment-investment context, the Bipartisan Agreement
departs from NAFTA, which provides that the Parties "should not derogate
from" environmental laws to attract investment,58 and from DR-CAFTA, which
provides that "each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or
otherwise derogate from" environmental laws to attract investment.59 The
Bipartisan Agreement amends the non-derogation obligation for environmental
laws and the covered MEAs so that NAFTA's "should not" and DR-CAFTA's
"shall strive to" now reads "shall not waive" in the new FTAs, with an
allowance for waivers permitted under law provided they do not violate the
54. See, e.g., United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, art. 18.2, April
12, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/PeruTPA/FinalTexts/Section_
Index.html [hereinafter U.S.-Peru]. Although the treaty is not yet in force, the full text of the
Agreement is available at the Internet source. The environmental chapters of the FTAs with
Colombia, Panama, and Korea that are pending congressional approval track the environmental
chapter of the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement almost verbatim. Those pending
agreements are available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Section_
Index.html. However, Peru is further obligated to engage in sustainable forestry practices, an
obligation which the other three countries have not assumed. See U.S.-Peru, annex 18.3.4.
55. BiPARTiSAN AGREEMENT, supra note 52.
56. See U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, art. 18.2 n.l, art. 18.3.
57. See, e.g., id. at art. 18.3(1)(b)(i), which provides that "where a course of action or
inaction reflects a reasonable, articulable, bonafide exercise of such discretion, or results from a
reasonable, articulable, bonafide decision regarding the allocation of such resources," then a
Party's failure to enforce its environmental laws and the covered MEAs is excused.
58. NAFTA, supra note 5.
59. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art.
17.2(2), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/
CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter DR-CAFTA].
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covered MEAs.60
Third, in a departure from DR-CAFTA where MEAs are not given
primacy over the terms of the FTA in the event of a conflict between the two,
61
the four pending FTAs include an article that roughly parallels NAFTA Article
104, thus creating a legal hierarchy that places MEAs above the FTA in the
event of a conflict:
In the event of any inconsistency between a Party's obligations
under this Agreement and a covered [multilateral
environmental] agreement, the Party shall seek to balance its
obligations under both agreements, but this shall not preclude
the Party from taking a particular measure to comply with its
obligations under the covered agreement, provided that the
primary purpose of the measure is not to impose a disguised
restriction on trade.62
A footnote to this article states that "[flor greater certainty, paragraph 4 is
without prejudice to multilateral environmental agreements other than covered
agreements. 63
The final change introduced by the Bipartisan Agreement deals with the
resolution of environmental disputes. 64 The environment chapters of the
Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea FTAs are largely imitative of the
60. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, art. 18.3(2), which provides as follows:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in their respective environmental
laws. Accordingly, a Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to
waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces
the protections afforded in those laws in a manner affecting trade or investment
between the Parties.
61. See DR-CAFTA supra note 59, art 17.12. This Article, entitled "Relationship to
Environmental Agreements," does not create a legal hierarchy between MEAs and DR-CAFTA
as does NAFTA Article 104. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 104. Instead, it provides as
follows:
The Parties recognize that multilateral environmental agreements to which they
are all party play an important role in protecting the environment globally and
domestically and that their respective implementation of these agreements is
critical to achieving the environmental objectives of these agreements. The
Parties further recognize that this Chapter ... can contribute to realizing the
goals of those agreements. Accordingly, the Parties shall continue to seek means
to enhance the mutual supportiveness of multilateral environmental agreements
to which they are all party and trade agreements to which they are all party.
This article alludes to the goal in the WSSD Plan of Implementation that MEAs and trade
agreements be mutually supportive. It is also consistent with the view expressed by some WTO
Members regarding the legal relationship of MEAs and WTO agreements, i.e., that there is no
hierarchy.
62. U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, art. 18.13(4) (emphasis added).
63. Id. atart. 18.13.4, n.11.
64. BiPARIsAN AGREEMENT, supra note 52.HeinOnline -- 19 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 545 2009
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NAAEC. 65 For example, they establish a citizen submission process, a
secretariat to accept such submissions and develop factual records, and an
Environmental Affairs Council to oversee the operation of the environment
chapter. However, in a departure from NAAEC, disputes that cannot be
resolved by the Council are referred to dispute settlement under the general
govemment-to-government dispute settlement panel mechanism that is
overseen by the agreement's Free Trade Commission (comprised of the trade
ministers of the contracting states). The referral of disputes to the trade dispute
panel mechanism rather than to a special environmental dispute panel is
required by the Bipartisan Agreement.66 The significance of this change is at
least threefold: (1) the decision whether to request a Party-to-Party settlement
of an environmental dispute now lies with the Parties' trade ministers instead of
with the government minister or official responsible for environmental affairs;
(2) a single trade minister may request dispute settlement panel resolution of an
environmental dispute instead of a majority of the environment ministers voting
to do so as is the case under the NAAEC; and (3) if a responding Party loses the
dispute and fails to bring its offending measure into compliance, then trade
sanctions (not merely fines as is the case under the NAAEC) may be imposed
by the prevailing Party.67 However, this change as a practical matter probably
signifies little or nothing, if the NAFTA experience is any guide. An
environmental dispute settlement panel has never been convened under the
NAAEC, and there have been only three NAFTA government-to-government
trade dispute panels convened during the 15 years that NAFTA has been in
force.68 Thus, the likelihood of a dispute settlement panel being convened to
resolve an environment dispute under the most recent FTAs seems extremely
remote. Nevertheless, the importance of having institutional mechanisms in
place for airing complaints about a country's environmental enforcement record
should not be totally dismissed. As several commentators have observed, the
citizen complaint mechanism established under the NAAEC has led to changes
in government behavior, even without resort to formal dispute settlement.69
65. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, ch. 18.
66. BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT, supra note 52.
67. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, art. 18.12(6), ch. 21.
68. See KEVIN C. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: READINGS, CASES, NoTES,
AND PROBLEMS 459-461 (2008).
69. See, e.g., Jonathon G. Dorm, NAAEC Citizen Submissions Against Mexico: An Analysis
of the Effectiveness of a Participatory Approach to Environmental Law Enforcement, 20 GEO.
INVL ENVTL. L. REv. 129, 129-130 (2007) ("The strength of the NAAEC procedure is its ability
to shine a light on a non-compliant party and 'shame' the party into complying with domestic
environmental laws. Such 'shaming' is effective at eliciting corrective action by the non-
compliant party because it creates public awareness that the party is knowingly engaging in
unlawful activities. While the citizen submission procedure under NAAEC is not perfect, it is a
viable candidate to serve as the foundation for the next generation of citizen participation-based
environmental treaties."); Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols and Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 Loy.
L.A. INTWL & COMP. L. REv. 389, 393 (2004) (arguing that the NAAEC's citizen submission
process plays "an important role in promoting treaty implementation, monitoring performance,
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One noteworthy development that is not part of the Bipartisan Agreement
itself is the first-ever biodiversity article in a U.S. FTA. The Trade Promotion
Agreements with Colombia and Peru exhort the Parties to promote biodiversity
and sustainable development in the following terms:
1. The Parties recognize the importance of the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity and their role in
achieving sustainable development.
2. Accordingly, the Parties remain committed to promoting
and encouraging the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity and all its components and levels,
including plants, animals, and habitat, and reiterate their
commitments in Article 18.1.
3. The Parties recognize the importance of respecting and
preserving traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous
and other communities that contribute to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity.
4. The Parties also recognize the importance of public
participation and consultations, as provided by domestic law,
on matters concerning the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity. The Parties may make information
publicly available about programs and activities, including
cooperative programs, it undertakes related to the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity.
70
The term "sustainable use" is defined as "non-consumptive or consumptive use
in a sustainable manner,",71 a singularly unhelpful and somewhat tautological
and ensuring that states comply with their treaty obligations."); Gustavo Vega-C~novas, NAFTA
and the Environment, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 61 (2001) ("The NAAEC may have
altered political relations between Mexico and the U.S. by providing a framework in which the
EPA could more legitimately claim to examine Mexico's international governance. Also at the
domestic level, it seems unlikely that the Mexican government would have responded seriously
to a petition from Mexican environmental interest groups absent the internationalization of the
incident."); Ignacia S. Moreno, James W. Rubin, Russell F. Smith III & Tseming Yang, Free
Trade and the Environment: The NAFTA, the NAAEC, and implications for the Future, 12 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 405,432 (1999) ("In practice, the NAAEC has established a unique mechanism and
structure for trilateral cooperation.... [I]t has also spurred domestic efforts to strengthen
domestic environmental laws and enforcement.").
70. U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, art. 18.11; U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-
Colom., art. 18.11, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_
FTA/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter U.S.-Colom.].
71. U.S.-Colom., supra note 70, art. 18.11, n.5.
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definition. Although these provisions are obviously hortatory, they nevertheless
represent an intriguing innovation in U.S. FTA negotiation and focus.
The four FTAs negotiated in 2007 contain the following clarifying
provision in their respective investment chapters: "Except in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.,, 72 This provision was first added to the U.S.-Chile FTA73 in
response to a concern that arbitral tribunals which were resolving NAFTA
investment disputes were undermining the ability of host countries to enact and
enforce rigorous and non-discriminatory environmental laws. That clarifying
provision has now been carried forward.
Finally, in the area of BITs, to date, the United States has concluded forty
bilateral investment treaties, all with developing countries. Until 2005, when
the United States negotiated a BIT with Uruguay, no U.S. BIT contained any
provisions on investment and the environment. In an about face, the Uruguay-
U.S. BIT has added two provisions on investment and environment. First,
Article 12 of the Uruguay-U.S. BIT provides as follows:
1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded
in domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party
shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from,
such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections
afforded in those laws as an encouragement for the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an
investment in its territory. If a Party considers that the other
Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall
consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
72. U.S.-Peru, supra note 54, annex 10-B, 3(b).
73. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, annex 10-D, 4(b), June 6,
2003, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.
html ("Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.").
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undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.74
While innovative in the history of U.S. BITs, this article is largely precatory.
First, the phrase "shall strive to ensure that is does not waive" is the same
phrase used in the parallel provision in the DR-CAFTA environment chapter.
This phrase has been turned into a mandatory obligation - "shall not waive" -
in the FTAs concluded in 2007 as a result of the Bipartisan Agreement.
Secondly, if there is a violation of this article, the aggrieved Party may only
request consultations. In other words, a violation may not be the subject of
binding Party-to-Party dispute settlement.
A second provision in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT concerns indirect or
"creeping" expropriation. Following investor-host state arbitrations under
NAFTA Chapter 11 that appeared to threaten the ability of a host state to enact
environmental regulations without also being required to pay compensation to
foreign investors for such regulation, beginning with the U.S.-Chile FTA and
all other post-NAFTA FTAs, the following clarifying provision has been
added:
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
75
expropriations.
The same provision was added verbatim to the U.S.-Uruguay BIT,76 the first
74. U.S.-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Uru., art.12, Nov. 4, 2005,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/BIT/Uruguay/SectionIndex.html (follow "Text of the
Agreement" hyperlink) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT].
75. Id., at annex B, I 4(b). A handful of U.S. BITs that were concluded after 1994 (the year
in which NAFTA went into effect) contain the following preambulary language: "these
objectives [to promote greater economic cooperation and investment] can be achieved without
relaxing health, safety and environmental measures of general application." See, e.g., Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Georgia Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Geor., Mar. 4, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-13
(1995) (entered into force Aug. 17, 1997); Treaty between the United States and the Republic of
Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Bol.,
Apr. 17, 1998, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-25 (2000) (entered into force June 6, 2001); Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Croatia Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Croat., July 13, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-29
(2000) (entered into force June 20,2001); Treaty between the United States and the Republic of
Azerbaijan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Azer., Aug. 1, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-47 (2000) (entered into force Aug. 2, 2001).
However, these BITs do not obligate the contracting states to refrain from derogating from their
environmental laws when approving or regulating an investment. Likewise, none of them
addresses the issue of indirect expropriation through regulatory measures designed to protect
public health, safety, and the environment.
76. See U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 71, annex B, 4(b).HeinOnline -- 19 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 549 2009
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provision of its kind in any U.S. BIT.
V. NEXT STEPS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
What should the next steps be within the United States? Arguably
needed but clearly missing are: (1) incentives; and (2) a mechanism to measure
the progress countries are making toward sustainable development. First, with
regard to incentives, the best way to effectuate the hortatory goals described in
Article 18.11 of the Peru and Colombia Trade Promotion Agreements on
promoting sustainable development and protecting biological diversity is to
build incentives that reward higher standards. There are many ways to structure
such incentives. Examples include offering accelerated tariff reductions for
countries that meet certain goals and making the availability of funds
contingent on performance. A creative package of incentives for continually
raising environmental and sustainable development standards needs to be
developed.
Second, regarding a mechanism to measure progress toward sustainable
development, having the trade lever (club?) at a country's disposal can serve as
a useful tool (weapon?) to deter (punish?) non-compliance. But, in the long
run, it will be more productive to encourage compliance rather than punish and
make threats over non-compliance. Future FTAs with developing countries, in
particular those with fragile ecosystems and rich biodiversity, should contain
provisions on sustainable development action plans with periodic benchmarks
to measure their progress, together with fully-funded budgets to support such
plans. A monitoring program run by existing regional or international bodies
should be established in order to avoid the appearance of"eco-imperialism" by
the United States as the sole monitor and evaluator of what constitutes
"progress." A long-range, integrated package of technical assistance, trade
capacity building, and environmental cooperation needs to be initiated by the
United States, and the United States needs to be prepared to financially support
this package over the ten-to-fifteen years during which implementation of an
FTA will take place. International organizations, other donor countries, and the
private sector must also play a role and contribute to this process.
CONCLUSION
Why should sustainable development and environmental protection be a
goal of multilateral trade agreements negotiated at the WTO, and why should
the United States pursue that goal not only at the WTO but also in its bilateral
trade agreements? The answer to these two questions is a simple but powerful
one: to improve the human condition. The principle of mutual supportiveness,
identified in paragraph 98 of the WSSD Plan of Implementation, is based on
the assumption that the overall objective of both environmental and trade legal
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regimes is the same, namely the improvement of the human condition by
protecting human, animal, and plant life and health.7
To what extent does the 2007 Bipartisan Agreement advance this goal?
Is the Bipartisan Agreement simply a case of old wine in a new bottle? Is it a
legal document or a political statement? The environmental chapter of the four
FTAs negotiated in 2007 does signal a departure from the environmental
chapters of post-NAFTA sister FTAs. Consistent with NAFTA, they again
give primacy to seven MEAs in the event of an inconsistency between the FTA
and the MEAs. This return to NAFTA Article 104's hierarchy of MEAs over
FTA provisions could prove to be a useful tool to reinforce commitments made
under the covered MEAs.
In a departure from NAFTA and its progeny, the Bipartisan Agreement
bars FTA partners from derogating from their environmental laws and the
covered MEAs in order to attract foreign investment. As a result of the
Bipartisan Agreement, a citizen submission process has been added to the
environment chapters of the four pending FTAs with a nominally more robust
dispute settlement process than the one that exists under NAFTA and other
U.S. FTAs. The reality, however, is that with the qualifiers that have been
placed on the obligation to enforce environmental laws and to observe the terms
of the covered MEAs, it seems highly improbable that the improved dispute
settlement mechanism mandated by the Bipartisan Agreement will ever be
invoked. Given the experience with the environmental dispute settlement
mechanism under the NAAEC -- pursuant to which no dispute settlement panel
has ever been convened -- any hypothetical threat to convene a dispute
settlement panel to hear an environmental complaint under the other U.S. FTAs
will ring hollow. Finally, and for the first time, the U.S. FTAs with Colombia
and Peru contain specific articles on biodiversity and sustainable development,
provisions that were not mandated by the Bipartisan Agreement. In short,
assuming that the four pending FTAs receive congressional approval, only time
will tell if the modest changes introduced by the Bipartisan Agreement will
help the environment and promote sustainable development.
All FTAs negotiated by the United States should ensure that their
interpretation and application take account of, and are mutually supportive of,
provisions of multilateral agreements on environment and sustainable
development. In short, efforts within the United States to safeguard the non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system must go hand-in-hand with the
commitment to sustainable development. As the largest trading nation in the
world, the United States is uniquely placed to influence the WTO trade,
investment, and sustainable development agenda in a positive way, but it
cannot do it alone. The United States is a leading advocate for prohibiting
harmful fisheries subsidies. It is also committed to safeguarding the integrity of
both sets of international obligations at issue - those in the WTO and those in
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MEAs to which the United States is a party. At the same time, unilateral
action should be avoided as far as possible. Unilateral action, taken without
being supported by multilateral mandates, not only undercuts multilateral
efforts at dealing with multilateral environmental problems, but also damages
the multilateral systems established for the purpose of coping with
environmental problems in a collaborative way.
78. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA POLICY BRIEF (Dec.
2005), www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2005/asset-uploadfile937_8545.
pdf.
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